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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 98-1631 
 
ESTATE OF AARON ZIMMERMAN; KATHRYN WATKINS, 
Administratrix a/k/a CATHERINE WATKINS, Executrix; 
LINDA PARDO, Individually and as heir to the ESTATE 
OF AARON ZIMMERMAN a/k/a AARON THOMAS 
ZIMMERMAN 
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SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION 
AUTHORITY; AMTRAK; CONSOLIDATED RAIL; THE CITY 
OF PHILADELPHIA 
 
       ESTATE OF AARON ZIMMERMAN and KATHRYN 
       WATKINS, Administratrix, a/k/a Catherine 
       Watkins, Executrix, and LINDA PARDO, individually 
       and as heir to the ESTATE OF AARON 
       ZIMMERMAN a/k/a AARON ZIMMERMAN, 
       Appellants 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
D.C. No.: 96-cv-6907 
District Judge: Honorable Jan E. DuBois 
 
Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, and SCIRICA and 
ROSENN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Argued January 28, 1999) 
 
(Filed February 26, 1999) 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
On August 6, 1994, the decedent Aaron Zimmerman, 
then twenty-three years of age, entered the area where 
trains run between 30th Street Station and Suburban 
Station in the City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. There he 
climbed to the top of a metal structure, which is 
approximately twenty-five feet tall and mounted in an 
upright position on a concrete foundation that supports a 
catenary at the top. A catenary is an arrangement of wires 
on a large steel framework. The wires connect the 
catenaries and carry high-voltage electricity to provide 
electric propulsion power for trains. While seated on the 
catenary crossbar, Zimmerman unfortunately received a 
fatal electrical shock. 
 
On August 30, 1996, the plaintiffs, administratrix 
Kathryn Watkins and the decedent's mother, Linda Pardo, 
filed a wrongful death and survival action with the Court of 
Common Pleas of Delaware County, Pennsylvania. 
Essentially, the plaintiffs alleged that the negligence of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority 
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("SEPTA"), Amtrak, Consolidated Rail Corporation 
("Conrail"), and the City of Philadelphia ("City") caused 
Zimmerman's untimely and tragic death. Amtrak, asserting 
federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S1331 based 
on its status as a federally chartered corporation in which 
the United States owns a majority of stock, removed the 
matter to the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S1441(a). 
 
On June 22, 1998, the District Court granted summary 
judgment for the defendants. See Estate of Zimmerman v. 
Southeastern Penn. Transp. Auth., 17 F. Supp. 2d 372 (E.D. 
Pa. 1998). The plaintiffs timely appealed. We affirm. 
 
I. 
 
On August 6, 1994, eyewitnesses observed Zimmerman 
climb a concrete wall and an iron fence to gain access to 
the general area enclosing railroad tracks on which 
commuter trains travel. This section extends from 20th 
Street to 30th Street. A bridge at 20th Street and John F. 
Kennedy Boulevard bounds the east end of the track area. 
The catenary is located in the track area sixty feet west of 
the bridge and is raised from the track level and supported 
by a concrete foundation on the north side of the track 
area. 
 
At midday, Zimmerman climbed the structure, reached 
the top, and sat on the crossbar of the catenary, where he 
was electrocuted. The electrocution caused a power outage. 
Following SEPTA policy, Paul Lazarus, the power director, 
quickly re-energized the circuit from his remote location at 
Wayne Junction station. Because Zimmerman was sitting 
on the catenary crossbar, which was grounded, the circuit 
would have been tripped once more if Zimmerman had 
been electrocuted again. But, the power was not cut off 
until SEPTA did so manually after being informed that 
Zimmerman was sitting on the catenary. Thereafter, 
firefighters removed Zimmerman from the catenary. Nine 
days later, he died from burns caused by the electrocution. 
 
SEPTA admitted to having sole possession and control 
over the track area, including the catenary. Amtrak 
supplied the electricity to the wires that caused 
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Zimmerman's death. According to the uncontradicted 
evidence in the record, only SEPTA used the train tracks in 
this area. 
 
The plaintiffs produced evidence that homeless people 
would enter the track area. Graffiti covered the inside wall 
nearby where Zimmerman was electrocuted. Paths led from 
John F. Kennedy Boulevard toward the track area. The 
plaintiffs secured written statements from witnesses who 
observed homeless people encroaching the track area. One 
witness wrote that he informed the police of people climbing 
the fence and entering the area. Another witness wrote that 
homeless people were in the track area "all the time" and 
that police periodically chased them away. However, there 
was no evidence that people climbed the catenary before 
Zimmerman's portentous ascent. 
 
There are several small signs stating "Danger: Live Wire" 
on the concrete wall adjacent to the track area at and 
around the bridge on 20th Street. One sign also includes 
the message "Keep Off." The plaintiffs claim that none of 
the warning signs are visible from the accident sight. The 
photographic evidence neither confirms nor refutes this 
claim. 
 
The District Court granted the defendants' motions for 
summary judgment. The Court held that Zimmerman was 
a trespasser and that no exception to the wantonness or 
willfulness standard for premises liability to trespassers 
applied. The Court concluded that the defendants acted 
neither wantonly nor willfully. The Court determined that 
Conrail and the City could not be liable for Zimmerman's 
death because they did not possess the track area or the 
catenary. The Court also held that Amtrak did not possess 
the land and owed no duty as the electricity supplier 
because Zimmerman did not lawfully come into proximity 
to the electricity. 
 
II. 
 
Our review of the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment is plenary. In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., ___ 
F.3d ___, ___ (slip op. at 22) (3d Cir. 1999). "[T]here is no 
issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring 
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the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that 
party. If the evidence is merely colorable or is not 
significantly probative, summary judgment may be 
granted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
249-50 (1986) (citations omitted). 
 
The plaintiffs' wrongful death and survival action is 
founded on a negligence theory of liability.1 Therefore, the 
plaintiffs must prove: (1) a duty owed to the decedent; (2) a 
breach of that duty by the defendants; (3) a causal 
connection between the defendants' breach and the 
resulting injury; and (4) injury suffered by the plaintiffs. 
See Estate of Swift v. Northeastern Hosp. of Phila., 690 A.2d 
719, 722 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). The failure to establish any 
one of these elements is a ground for summary judgment. 
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) ("In 
our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the 
entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for 
discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to 
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 
element essential to that party's case, and on which that 
party will bear the burden of proof at trial."). 
 
A. 
 
Before we ascertain the extent of the duty owed to 
Zimmerman, we first decide which defendants, if any, owed 
Zimmerman a duty. The plaintiffs maintain that a genuine 
issue of material fact existed regarding whether all the 
defendants had a duty to prevent harm to Zimmerman 
because they purportedly had control over the area where 
Zimmerman was injured. The plaintiffs also argue that 
Amtrak, because it supplied the electricity that ran through 
the wires attached to the catenary, owed an additional duty 
to Zimmerman. 
 
The duty to protect against known dangerous conditions 
falls upon the possessor of the land. Blackman v. Federal 
Realty Inv. Trust, 664 A.2d 139, 142 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995); 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In this action, the District Court applied Pennsylvania law because the 
death and events leading up to it occurred in Pennsylvania. We do the 
same. 
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see also Rolick v. Collins Pine Co., 975 F.2d 1009, 1011 (3d 
Cir. 1992); Rossino v. Kovacs, 718 A.2d 755, 756-57 (Pa. 
1998). The possessor of land occupies the land with the 
intent to control it. Bloom v. Waste Management Corp., 615 
F. Supp. 1002, 1015 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Blackman, 664 A.2d 
at 142; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts S 328E(a) 
(1965). 
 
There is uncontroverted evidence that SEPTA was the 
sole possessor of the track area. Therefore, only SEPTA 
owed Zimmerman a possessor's duty to entrants on its 
land. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs claim that the other 
defendants also incurred duties as land possessors. We 
disagree. 
 
The plaintiffs argue that Amtrak and SEPTA allegedly had 
an agreement related to the maintenance of the catenary 
and the surrounding area and to liability for torts 
committed in that location. The plaintiffs, however, failed to 
produce such an agreement, and defense counsel denies its 
existence. No evidence in the record suggests that Amtrak 
possessed or controlled the track area or the catenary. 
 
The plaintiffs also assert that Conrail possessed the 
property because Conrail used the tracks in the track area. 
The plaintiffs offer no evidence that Conrail utilized the 
railroad tracks. Besides, Conrail's alleged use of the tracks 
does not equate with possession. Access to land need not 
entail control over land. 
 
Lastly, the plaintiffs maintain that the City owns the 
track area and claim that no evidence shows that the City 
did not own the property. The plaintiffs bear the burden of 
persuasion, and they failed to present evidence of the City's 
alleged ownership. Contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, 
they needed to produce that evidence in conjunction with 
its opposition to the City's summary judgment motion. 
 
Thus, there is no genuine issue of material fact over 
whether Amtrak, Conrail, or the City possessed the track 
area. Accordingly, Amtrak, Conrail, and the City did not 
owe Zimmerman any duty of care flowing from their 
purported position as land possessors. 
 
Nevertheless, Amtrak, as the supplier of electricity, owed 
Zimmerman a duty of care. The uncontradicted evidence in 
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the record establishes that Amtrak supplied the electricity 
that flowed through the wires attached to the catenary. 
Suppliers of electricity owe a duty of care to all people in 
proximity to the wires through which high-voltage 
electricity flows; the degree of care varies with the status of 
the injured person on the land. See Heller v. Consolidated 
Rail Corp., 576 F. Supp. 6, 12 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd, 
720 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1983). We do not agree with Amtrak's 
assertion that it owed a duty to Zimmerman only if he was 
lawfully in proximity to the electrical lines. Under 
Pennsylvania law, electricity suppliers owe a duty, albeit a 
limited one, to avoid wanton or willful injury to trespassers. 
See id. This rule comports with the notion that trespassers 
be given some, however modest, protection against 
tortfeasors. See, e.g., Barre v. Reading City Passenger Ry. 
Co., 26 A. 99, 100 (Pa. 1893) ("Even trespassers are entitled 
to humane consideration."). 
 
Therefore, SEPTA, as the possessor of the track area, and 
Amtrak, as the supplier of electricity, owed Zimmerman a 
duty of care. As a matter of law, Conrail and the City had 
no duty to prevent harm to Zimmerman. Accordingly, the 
District Court did not err in entering summary judgment 
for Conrail and the City. 
 
B. 
 
Having concluded that SEPTA and Amtrak owed 
Zimmerman a duty of care, we must demarcate the extent 
of that duty. Zimmerman's status at the site of his injury 
plays a crucial role in determining the degree of care SEPTA 
and Amtrak owed Zimmerman. 
 
The plaintiffs claim that there was an issue of material 
fact whether Zimmerman was a trespasser or a licensee. 
They theorize that the defendants, by permitting 
Zimmerman and other homeless people to enter and remain 
in the track area, may have given Zimmerman implied 
consent to be in the track area and, thus, Zimmerman may 
have been a licensee. 
 
"A trespasser [is] `a person who enters or remains upon 
land in the possession of another without a privilege to do 
so created by the possessor's consent or otherwise.' " 
 
                                7 
  
Rossino, 718 A.2d at 756-57 (quoting Restatement (Second) 
of Torts S 329 (1965)). "A licensee, on the other hand is `a 
person who is privileged to enter or remain on land only by 
virtue of the possessor's consent.' " Id. at 757 (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 330 (1965)). 
 
The plaintiffs cite no authority standing for the 
proposition that consent to use property can be implied by 
a failure to take sufficient precautions to prevent people 
from entering the land. The plaintiffs' theory seeks to turn 
every foreseeable trespasser into a licensee. However, the 
law recognizes that a foreseeable trespasser is still a 
trespasser. See Oswald v. Hausman, 548 A.2d 594, 598-99 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (distinguishing foreseeable 
trespassers from licensees). Mere acquiescence to 
trespassing does not alter an entrant's status. 
 
Even assuming arguendo that a possessor's assent to 
trespassing amounts to implied consent for using the land, 
uncontradicted evidence submitted by the plaintiffs 
demonstrates that SEPTA, the possessor of the track area, 
did not acquiesce to the presence of trespassers upon its 
land. Linda Holman, whose statement the plaintiffs 
submitted in opposition to summary judgment, wrote: 
"Back where [Zimmerman] was burned there are homeless 
people all the time. The police chase them and they come 
back." Gerald Peterson, whose statement the plaintiffs also 
secured, wrote: "I saw kids back there a few days before the 
burn incident with bicycles. The Amtrak police caught 
them." Thus, the evidence the plaintiffs submitted to show 
that people entered the track area also established that 
SEPTA utilized police to eject unauthorized persons from 
the track area. SEPTA did not acquiesce to the entry and 
use of the track area by persons who were not performing 
railroad-related work. Consequently, even if knowledge of 
people's presence on the land could create implied consent 
to use the land, a reasonable factfinder must conclude that 
SEPTA did not give Zimmerman implied permission to enter 
and remain in the track area. 
 
The plaintiffs also maintain that there was a causeway 
that enabled unencumbered access from John F. Kennedy 
Boulevard to the track area. They apparently invoke the 
permissive crossing doctrine and maintain that the 
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causeway created an implied license for Zimmerman to 
enter and remain in the track area. 
 
       A permissive crossing is an express or implied license 
       to pass over the property of another. It must be 
       restricted to a well-defined location and must be shown 
       to be used frequently, continuously, and notoriously by 
       the public. Essential to the establishment of the 
       permissive way is the well-defined location of the way 
       in a limited area. 
 
Henry v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 84 A.2d 675, 677 (Pa. 
1951) (citations omitted). 
 
The permissive crossing doctrine is inapplicable in this 
case. The people who entered the track area without 
express permission did not briefly pass over the property in 
order to get to the other side of the tracks. Rather, they 
remained on the property for substantial periods of time. In 
cases where Pennsylvania courts have found a permissive 
crossing, the property was used as a crossing, not a haven. 
See, e.g., Shaw v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 96 A.2d 923, 925 
(Pa. 1953); Henry, 84 A.2d at 676; Echon v. Pennsylvania 
R.R. Co., 76 A.2d 175, 178 & n.4 (Pa. 1950); Gaul v. 
Consolidated Rail Corp., 556 A.2d 892, 895 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1989). People, like Zimmerman, who do not intend to cross 
the property cannot successfully invoke the permissive 
crossing doctrine. See Scarborough v. Lewis, 518 A.2d 563, 
565 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding permissive crossing 
doctrine inapplicable where plaintiff did not intend to cross 
railroad tracks), rev'd on other grounds, 565 A.2d 122 (Pa. 
1989). In addition, a permissive crossing must have a path 
that traverses railroad tracks, and there is no evidence of a 
path across the tracks in this case. See Hamley v. George, 
76 A.2d 181, 183 (Pa. 1950) ("A permissive crossing is a 
defined foot path leading to and crossing over railway 
tracks, which is being habitually used and places upon the 
railway company a duty of care comparable to that required 
at a regular crossing."). Rather, the evidence merely 
presents a path leading toward the tracks. See 
Scarborough, 518 A.2d at 565, 573 (holding path leading 
toward tracks insufficient to create permissive crossing). 
Because the people, including Zimmerman, entering and 
remaining in the track area without express authorization 
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did not use the property as a mere crossing, the permissive 
crossing doctrine did not render Zimmerman an implied 
licensee. 
 
Further, even if SEPTA had impliedly consented to permit 
Zimmerman to enter and remain in the track area, there is 
no evidence that SEPTA consented to permit Zimmerman to 
climb up and sit atop the catenary. Therefore, there is no 
genuine issue of material fact over Zimmerman's entrant 
classification. He was a trespasser as a matter of law. 
Accordingly, the plaintiffs must show that SEPTA or Amtrak 
committed wanton or willful negligence or misconduct. See 
Rossino, 718 A.2d at 756. 
 
The plaintiffs contend that exceptions to the general duty 
owed to trespassers should heighten the defendants' 
standard of care in this case. The plaintiffs argue that the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 337, pertaining to highly 
dangerous artificial conditions encountered by known 
trespassers, imposes a more substantial duty on SEPTA 
than the duty to refrain from wantonly or willfully injuring 
the trespasser. 
 
Section 337 provides: 
 
       A possessor of land who maintains on the land an 
       artificial condition which involves a risk of death or 
       serious bodily harm to persons coming in contact with 
       it, is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to 
       trespassers by his failure to exercise reasonable care to 
       warn them of the condition if 
 
       (a) the possessor knows or has reason to know of 
       their presence in dangerous proximity to the condition, 
       and 
 
       (b) the condition is of such a nature that he has 
       reason to believe that the trespasser will not discover it 
       or realize the risk involved. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 337 (1965). 
 
The catenary, along with the electric wires, is properly 
classified as an artificial condition, rather than an activity 
or a force. However, Pennsylvania jurisprudence has not 
adopted this section of the Restatement. Under 
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Pennsylvania law, there is no heightened duty to 
foreseeable trespassers for artificial conditions. 
Micromanolis v. Woods School, Inc., 989 F.2d 696, 700 (3d 
Cir. 1993); Graham v. Sky Haven Coal, Inc., 563 A.2d 891, 
896 & n.8 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). Consequently, SEPTA did 
not owe Zimmerman a heightened duty because of the 
catenary's danger. Besides, even if Pennsylvania adopted 
section 337 of the Restatement, SEPTA had no reason to 
believe that trespassers could not discover the dangerous 
condition or appreciate the risk. 
 
The plaintiffs assert that SEPTA and Amtrak are subject 
to a heightened standard of care because the high-voltage 
electrical wire formed a dangerous instrumentality. 
Generally, the supplier of electricity or the possessor of 
land site owes a heightened, rather than an ordinary, 
degree of care to an entrant on land with high-voltage 
electrical transmission lines. See Stark v. Lehigh Foundries, 
Inc., 130 A.2d 123, 128-31 (Pa. 1957); Yoffee v. 
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 123 A.2d 636, 645 (Pa. 
1956); Bailey v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 598 A.2d 41, 47 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Beary v. Container Gen. Corp., 533 
A.2d 716, 720 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). "However, this 
heightened duty of care extends only to those lawfully in 
proximity to the wires. The standard of care owed to 
trespassers by suppliers of electricity is a duty to avoid 
wilful and wanton injury." Heller, 576 F. Supp. at 12 n.7 
(emphasis in original) (citation omitted); see also Dunnaway 
v. Duquesne Light Co., 423 F.2d 66, 69 n.2 (3d Cir. 1970) 
("Under Pennsylvania law an electric company as the 
supplier of a dangerous agent is under a duty to use the 
very highest degree of care practicable to avoid injury to 
every one who may be lawfully in proximity to its wires." 
(internal quotations omitted)); Graham, 563 A.2d at 897 n.8 
(noting Commonwealth's long-recognized rule limiting 
landowner's duty to trespasser to refraining from wanton or 
willful misconduct). In light of Zimmerman's status as a 
trespasser, SEPTA, as possessor of the land, and Amtrak, 
as supplier of the electricity, did not owe Zimmerman a 
heightened duty of care. 
 
The plaintiffs claim that the child trespasser exception 
should apply in this case because, although he was twenty- 
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three years old when he was electrocuted, Zimmerman 
suffered from bipolar disorder and could not fully 
comprehend the danger he faced. The child trespasser 
exception, also known as the attractive nuisance doctrine, 
is limited to instances in which children unlawfully enter or 
remain on land. The law does not impose upon owners and 
possessors of land a higher duty to protect from injury 
adults with emotional disorders. Furthermore, the plaintiffs 
failed to present medical evidence suggesting that 
Zimmerman, because he was a manic depressive, had a 
diminished capacity to appreciate risks. Hence, the child 
trespasser exception does not apply to this case. 
 
Thus, the District Court committed no error in 
concluding that the appropriate standard of care was the 
duty to refrain from wanton or willful misconduct. 
 
C. 
 
The plaintiffs assert that there was sufficient evidence of 
wanton misconduct to survive summary judgment. The 
plaintiffs claim that the defendants' insufficient warning of 
the wires' danger despite the regular trespassing on to the 
track area, as well as the re-energizing of the power lines 
without checking to see why the circuit had tripped, 
amounted to wanton misconduct. 
 
       Wanton misconduct . . . means that the actor has 
       intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character, 
       in disregard of a risk known to him or so obvious that 
       he must be taken to have been aware of it, and so 
       great as to make it highly probable that harm would 
       follow. 
 
Evans v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 212 A.2d 440, 443 (Pa. 
1965) (internal quotations omitted); accord Dudley v. USX 
Corp., 606 A.2d 916, 922 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). 
 
SEPTA did not commit wanton misconduct by allegedly 
inadequately posting warning signs pertaining to the 
electrical wires' danger. Although SEPTA was aware, or at 
least should have been aware, that trespassers entered and 
remained in the track area, SEPTA had no knowledge that 
trespassers climbed the catenary structure. The plaintiffs 
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submitted no evidence that anyone had climbed the 
structure or had been electrocuted on it before 
Zimmerman. Consequently, the risk of electrocution from 
climbing the catenary was not so great that more warning 
signs were required. 
 
Knowledge of a specific risk cannot be imputed from 
knowledge of a general risk. In Micromanolis, this court 
held that the defendant's knowledge that trespassers swam 
in a pool did not equate with constructive knowledge of the 
risk that someone would dive into the middle of the 
unlighted pool at night without checking the water level. 
989 F.2d at 702. Likewise, SEPTA's knowledge that people 
entered and remained in the track area does not equate 
with knowledge of the risk that someone would climb the 
catenary structure, sit on top of it, and get electrocuted. 
 
Moreover, SEPTA did not commit wanton misconduct 
when Lazarus re-energized the circuit after Zimmerman 
had tripped it. The risk of harm caused by re energizing the 
circuit was low. Railroad circuits get tripped regularly; only 
rarely are they tripped by humans. See Carpenter v. Penn 
Central Transp. Co., 409 A.2d 37, 38 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) 
(noting in 1974 two of 1190 tripped circuits were caused by 
humans and most of others had been caused by birds, 
icicles, and other small objects contacting power lines). At 
the time Lazarus re-energized the line, he had no reason to 
believe that a human, rather than a bird, had tripped the 
circuit. There was little probability that harm would result 
from re-energizing the circuit. Besides, Zimmerman did not 
trip the circuit after Lazarus re-energized it; hence, 
Zimmerman was not electrocuted after Lazarus restored the 
power. 
 
There is no genuine issue of material fact over whether 
SEPTA breached its duty to refrain from wanton or willful 
misconduct. Accordingly, the District Court did not err in 
granting summary judgment for SEPTA. 
 
The plaintiffs presented no evidence that Amtrak, which 
was not responsible for the maintenance of the wires in the 
track area, committed wanton or willful misconduct with 
respect to its role as the supplier of electricity. Hence, 
Amtrak did not breach its duty to Zimmerman. Therefore, 
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the District Court committed no error in granting summary 
judgment for Amtrak. 
 
D. 
 
The plaintiffs argue that they should be able to 
demonstrate the defendants' negligence through the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. They maintain that the District 
Court erred in holding that res ipsa loquitur could not be 
used to prove wanton or willful misconduct. 
 
Res ipsa loquitur is "a shorthand expression for 
circumstantial proof of negligence." Gilbert v. Korvette, Inc., 
327 A.2d 94, 99 (Pa. 1974). 
 
       (1) It may be inferred that harm suffered by the 
       plaintiff is caused by negligence of the defendant when 
 
       (a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not 
       occur in the absence of negligence; 
 
       (b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of 
       the plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently 
       eliminated by the evidence; and 
 
       (c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the 
       defendant's duty to the plaintiff. 
 
Id. at 100 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts S 328D 
(1965)). 
 
We need not decide whether the doctrine is applicable to 
torts allegedly committed against trespassers because the 
plaintiffs have not established every element of the 
doctrine. See Micciche v. Eastern Elevator Co., 645 A.2d 
278, 281 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (holding plaintiff not entitled 
to res ipsa loquitur instruction because he failed to 
establish every element of doctrine). Most fundamentally, 
the evidence did not eliminate the possibility that 
Zimmerman's conduct had caused the electrocution. 
Zimmerman trespassed onto SEPTA property, climbed the 
catenary, and sat on top of the structure in close proximity 
to high-voltage wires. The danger posed by the wires was 
obvious. Even if Zimmerman had never seen the warning 
signs posted on the bridge at 20th Street, he should have 
realized that he was flirting with peril. A reasonable person 
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would have recognized that electrical wires running parallel 
and above train tracks posed a grave danger. Consequently, 
the plaintiffs cannot establish the second element of the res 
ipsa loquitur doctrine. 
 
In addition, the plaintiffs have not presented sufficient 
evidence that the purported negligence fell within the scope 
of the defendants' duty to Zimmerman. SEPTA and Amtrak 
had a duty to refrain from wanton or willful conduct. As 
discussed above, no reasonable factfinder could conclude 
that either SEPTA or Amtrak intentionally injured 
Zimmerman or disregarded a known high risk. The District 
Court did not err in concluding that the plaintiffs' case 
could not survive summary judgment on a res ipsa loquitur 
theory. 
 
III. 
 
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. Costs 
to be taxed against the appellants. 
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